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1 Outline
How can consciousness, how can the mind be causally efficacious in a world
which seems—in some sense—to be thoroughly governed by physical cau-
sality? Mental causation has been a nagging problem in philosophy since
the beginning of the modern age, when, inspired by the rise of physics, a
metaphysical picture became dominant according to which the manifest
macrophysical world of rocks, trees, colors, sounds etc. could be elimina-
ted in favor of, or identified with, the microconstituents of these entities
and their basic physical properties, plus their effects on human or animal
minds. Against the background of this ontology, the argument from cau-
sal closure, or the causal completeness of physics, exerts strong pressure
to also identify consciousness with microphysical entities—or even to eli-
minate it in favor of the latter—the only other options apparently being
either the denial of the causal closure of the physical level, epiphenome-
nalism about the mind, or the view that its physical effects are generally
overdetermined. In this paper, however, I want to introduce what I call
the “microstructure view” (MV) of the brain-consciousness relation, and I
want to try to make plausible that the problem of mental causation can
also be solved, or perhaps rather dissolved, on the basis of this account. On
the MV, the minimal neuronal correlates of consciousness—of the global
state of consciousness, or specific states of consciousness such as pain—are
not identical with these states, but rather constitute their microstructure,
or, as I shall also say, equivalently, compose them. For example, if a certain
pattern of neuronal activity in the prefrontal cortex is the minimal neuro-
nal correlate of a certain kind of intention— that is, if it is both necessary
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and sufficient for the presence of this intention—I shall also say that it is
the neuronal microstructure of this intention and that it composes it.
The reason that there is also a sense in which the MV dissolves the pro-
blem of mental causation is that it abandons the metaphysical background
picture against which it is commonly posed. It is essential to the MV that
an identification (or elimination) is rejected not only for consciousness, but
also for the manifest macrophysical world—and of course also for uncons-
cious mentality, if such there be. Mental causation can only be adequately
understood as one kind of macro level causation among others. So the
microstructure relation is supposed to hold not only between states of
consciousness and their neuronal correlates, but also between, say, plants
and the cells that compose them and the molecules, atoms and ultimately
subatomic entities that compose these in turn.
The guiding idea of the account of mental causation is that there is no
competition for causal powers between macro phenomena and the micro
level phenomena composing them and thus also no conflict between the
causal closure at the microphysical level and the reality of mental causati-
on. Micro level causation does not preempt macro level causation; it rather
explains it.
The outline of the paper is as follows. I will first present and analyze the
argument from causal closure in more detail. In the course of this analysis,
I will briefly say why we should not choose one of the options of denying
the causal completeness of physics, of epiphenomenalism, overdetermina-
tion or the identity theory, and I will explain why we also do not need to
choose between them. The brief critique of the identity theory will natu-
rally lead on to a more thorough exposition of the MV, culminating in the
promised account of mental causation.
2 The Problem of Mental Causation
Consider the following four propositions:
(1) Mental entities (states, events, properties, facts etc.) have phy-
sical effects.
(2) The physical domain is causally closed: each physical effect has
a sufficient physical cause.
(3) Mental entities are real and distinct from physical ones.
(4) The effects of mental entities are not generally overdetermined.
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Now the familiar problem is that these propositions cannot be jointly true.
Any three of them will entail the negation of the fourth. So if the mind is
causally efficacious in the physical domain (1), and this domain is causally
closed (2), but mental entities are real and distinct from physical ones (3),
then the effects of consciousness entities must be overdetermined (∼ 4).
Or if the effects of mental entities are not generally overdetermined (4),
and mental entities are real and distinct from physical ones (2), and the
physical domain is causally closed (3), then mental entities cannot be cau-
sally efficacious in the physical domain (∼ 1). Likewise one could argue for
the falsity of the principle of causal closure and thus for (∼ 2) on the basis
of (1), (3) and (4). The most important and influential line of argument,
however, has been to argue for the identity theory and thus for (∼ 3) on
the basis of (1), (2) and (4).
I shall now first argue that neither epiphenomenalism, overdeterminati-
on nor the identity theory are plausible options. My brief discussions are
not intended to do justice to all the issues raised by these positions. This
would obviously be impossible in a short paper like this. Rather the point
is to draw some lessons from the failure of these positions that will prepare
the positive solution to be presented later and to provide some motivation
for accepting that solution, or at least for taking it seriously.
3 Epiphenomenalism
Discussions of epiphenomenalism sometimes begin by introducing a di-
stinction between those properties of an event that are causally relevant
and those which are not. For example, the fact that the whiskey I had
contained alcohol causally explains the fact that the three shots I had
made me drunk, while the fact that the whiskey was made in Tennessee
does not (Bieri 1992). There are two points worth noting about this for
present purposes. First, such examples only show that an entity may have
properties which are causally irrelevant relative to certain effects. But they
fail to establish the sort of absolute causal irrelevance which the epipheno-
menalist asserts for consciousness. The property of having been made in
Tennessee may be irrelevant to the causal explanation of my drunkenness,
but it certainly is not causally irrelevant per se. For example, the fact that
it was made in Tennessee may have played a causal role in my decision to
choose this particular kind of whiskey. So examples of this kind cannot be
used to support the notion of an absolutely causally irrelevant property.
Second, note that the fact that the property of being composed of alcohol
caused the drunkenness does not show that the whiskey, or, more strictly,
the event of my drinking whiskey, is causally irrelevant as such. We would
not ordinarily conclude that whiskey is incapable of causing drunkenness.
The natural thing to say here would rather be that the fact that whiskey
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contains alcohol explains why and how it can cause drunkenness. I shall
later argue that we should think about mental causation in a similar way.
Epiphenomenalism is so implausible that it is not necessary to argue
against it in the present context. Only somebody despairing of solving the
problem of mental causation will be tempted by it. But we shall see that
there is no reason for such despair.
4 Overdetermination
Overdetermination would occur if there were two or more independent
and yet equally sufficient causes of the same effect. It is often suggested
that there are actual instances of overdetermination. If this were true,
it would seem to make the overdetermination option more acceptable. It
would still be odd that the physical effects of mental causes should always
be overdetermined, but this might seem tolerable. After all, embracing
overdetermination would solve the problem of mental causation! I want to
make plausible though that the alleged examples of overdetermination are
unconvincing. The critique of these examples will show that overdetermi-
nation is not a genuine option and will also teach us an important lesson
about causal explanation.
Consider a standard example, like a man shot with several bullets. Each
of these bullets, we assume, would have been sufficient by itself to kill him.
Does it not follow that there are several independent and yet equally suf-
ficient causes of the same effect which is thus overdetermined? It seems to
me it does not. From the fact that each bullet would have killed the man
even in the absence of the others, it does not follow that some actual event
was overdetermined. When we track the causal paths of the individual bul-
lets through the body, it seems clear that at some level the bullets always
cause different things. This should be obvious from their different spatio-
temporal paths through the body. It is a consequence of this that in some
cases it will be clear that one bullet was the cause. For example, it might
enter the brain and instantly terminate all life-functions. This bullet will
clearly be the cause of the death, notwithstanding the fact that, if it had
not killed, the man would have died minutes, hours or weeks later, from
the damage done by another bullet. That fact as such is just irrelevant to
the assessment of what actually caused the death. This kind of case is often
referred to as one of causal ‘preemption.’ The actual cause has preempted
a potential different cause. In other kinds of cases, it seems more appro-
priate to say that different causal paths converge, so that two or more
bullets jointly cause the death. This will be so if the further bullets cause
the death to happen differently than it would have, had they not been
present. For example, several bullets may enter the heart simultaneously,
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causing greater damage than each of them would have individually and an
earlier and less painful death.
It is sometimes objected against this way of thinking that it makes too
many properties of the effect event essential, which would thus become
very ‘fragile.’ But this reasoning is fallacious. Of course the death might
have occurred in countless other ways. But we causally explain the actual
death, not some counterfactual death. However a distinction between es-
sential and accidental properties of a particular event is drawn, if at all:
causal explanations of events can and will also explain their accidental
properties. These are also part of the way the event is. A related move
(Funkhouser 2002) is to introduce a notion of an event like a death simpli-
citer, with no further specification of the manner of death. The idea then is
that the death simpliciter is overdetermined in any case. But this move is
hardly convincing either. Obviously there is no death or other event which
does not happen in a specific way, and one can hardly prove there is over-
determination simply by refusing to specify the relevant effects further.
We can draw a lesson from the preceding discussion about when cau-
ses may be said to compete with one another. The bullets can be said
to causally compete with one another in the sense that there may be a
meaningful question as to which actually caused a given phenomenon. As
we have seen, in some cases it will be correct to say that one rather than
the other caused a certain death. Mental and physical causes also some-
times compete in this way. For example, we often ask whether the cause
of certain disease symptoms is psychological or physiological, and in some
cases an unambiguous answer to this question is possible. I want to suggest
though that this is only possible when the putative causes operate on the
same level. Causes at different levels do not compete with one another.
Intentions, or brute physical forces may both cause my arm to move and
so it makes sense to ask, in a given situation, which kind of cause was
responsible for the arm movement. But we cannot ask in the same way
whether the intention or its neurophysiological correlate caused the arm
to go up. The reason is that the correlate is not even a candidate for being
the cause of the arm movement. It causes things at the physiological level,
and the arm is not at that level, though it has parts which are. Or so I
shall argue more extensively later. To see that mental events and their
physiological correlates do not causally compete with one another becau-
se they operate at different levels will be the key to solving, respectively
dissolving the problem of mental causation.
5 Identity Theory
It is not my goal in this paper to provide a decisive refutation of the
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identity theory. This would be a task for one or more separate papers.1
However, it will be useful to take a brief look at the central difficulty of
the identity theory, focusing on its type identity version. This difficulty
can be brought out in several different ways, but the following is perhaps
the most straightforward. The identity theorist claims that a state of cons-
ciousness is identical with its minimal neuronal correlate—or, for example,
water with the H2O molecules it is composed of. But it seems hard to deny
that knowing that one, for example, is afraid of the dark is different from
knowing that one is in neuronal state X, where we will take “X” to abbre-
viate a specification of the minimal neuronal correlate of being afraid of
the dark. Obviously, one can know one without knowing the other. Moreo-
ver, this difference seems to be a cognitively significant difference in the
contents of the relevant knowledge—as opposed to a mere difference in the
vehicles of representation. That is, it is not like the difference between a
German speaker saying to himself “Ich habe Angst vor der Dunkelheit”
and an English speaker saying to himself “I am afraid of the dark.”
The identity theorist will now say something like that these different
states provide different modes of access to the same entity.2 He may liken
this to the fact that, for example, the same tree can be seen from different
perspectives. He may also appeal to a Fregean notion of sense, according to
which words or concepts may differ in sense while still referring to the same
entity. This strategy can certainly be made to sound plausible. Ultimately,
however, it is difficult to understand. For in the examples commonly given,
the difference in perspective or sense always involves different properties of
what is accessed, such that a difference with regard to the mode of access
would seem to be inextricably linked to objective ontological differences
in what is accessed. So, for example, when I see a tree from different per-
spectives, I ipso facto see it as standing in different spatial relations to
me, and I will also access different inherent properties of the tree when
seeing it from different sides. Likewise, the expressions “animals with a
heart” and “animals with a kidney”—to use a time-worn example for the
sense/reference or intension/extension distinction—can also only pick out
the same class of animals in cognitively significant different ways because
they make reference to different properties of these animals. So if these
cases are taken as a model—and what else could we use as such—it seems
the most the identity theorist might achieve is to replace a difference of
things or events through a difference in the properties of these events or
things. This would amount to what is usually referred to as a token identity
1 I have given a much more extensive critique of the identity theory in my yet unpu-
blished dissertation. Other recent critiques of the identity theory similar in spirit to
mine include McGinn (2001) and Horgan & Tienson (2001).
2 Very many authors have defended the identity theory in this way. Compare, for
example, McLaughlin (2001), Pauen (1999) and Perry (2001).
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thesis. But it will nowadays be generally accepted that this is not enough
to solve the problem of mental causation; irreducible mental properties are
just as offensive from the physicalist point of view as irreducible mental
events, and to account for the causal relevance of the former is as much a
problem as to account for the causal relevance of the latter.
The point can also be made by saying that the examples do not make
intelligible how it would be possible for the same fact to be known or acces-
sed in different ways. They only show that the same thing or event might
be accessed in different ways by being accessed as the bearer of different
properties and thus by apprehending different facts about it. This cannot
be a model for how it might be possible to know the same fact in different
ways. But such a model is precisely what we need in order to understand
how knowing that one is afraid and knowing that one is in brain state X
might be knowing the same thing in different ways, because obviously it
is knowledge of facts that we are dealing with here. Moreover, we have
already pointed out that it will not help to appeal to additional distinct
properties, simply because that will subvert the purposes of the identity
theorist. So it seems that the identity theorist is stuck with an unexplained
notion of what I will call “merely subjectively different” modes of access
or ways of knowing. To call these “merely subjective” is to mark the fact
that there is supposed to be a cognitively significant difference between
the relevant intentional states which does not correspond to any objective
difference in the (putative) objects of these states, that is, the states of af-
fairs they are directed at. I have argued that we have no model in ordinary
thought for this decidedly metaphysical idea; nor do I know how it can be
made intelligible in some other way. It thus seems best to avoid it.
6 The Principle of Causal Closure
Flatly denying the principle of causal closure also does not seem to be an
attractive option. There is a lot of empirical evidence for at least some
version of the principle. Throughout the history of science, it has been
shown for a wide range of initially apparently recalcitrant phenomena that
they can be explained in terms of basic physical entities and forces.3 This
has been shown for chemical and biological phenomena, and there seems
to be no good empirical reason to think that mental phenomena will prove
to be an exception. As far as I know, there are no solid scientific data
supporting the view that consciousness, to put it crudely, can do things
that cannot be explained physiologically and ultimately microphysically.
3 For an account of the relevant history of science, see the appendix of Papineau
(2002).
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Are we thus in deep trouble? Fortunately, though, there is still room for
disagreement how the principle should be formulated and understood and
what it entails. I want to argue now that there is no reading in which
“physical” in (1) and (2) is univocal and both come out as plausibly true.4
The causal powers we commonly attribute to the mind are causal powers
at the common sense macrophysical level. They are powers to move the hu-
man or animal body and other macroscopic entities by moving that body.
By contrast, causal closure only obtains at the microphysical level, presu-
mably that of quantum mechanics, or an even lower level. Only at that
level can everything be completely causally explained in terms of its level
alone. This is so because only at that level, since all entities are compo-
sed of microphysical entities, there is literally no external causal influence.
That is not true for any of the levels above the microphysical level. For ex-
ample, on the biological level there is obviously continuous external causal
influence: organisms crucially depend on their non-biological environment,
on the causal powers of the sun, the atmosphere etc. So the principle of
causal closure is only true if “physical” is taken to mean “microphysical.”
But then it does not exclude causation above the microphysical level, neit-
her mental nor other kinds of macro causation.
It is important to emphasize that, even after the mistake of equivocating
on different senses of “physical” is corrected, the principle of causal closure,
while not forcing us to embracing either epiphenomenalism, overdetermi-
nation or the identity theory, still does put an important constraint on
our account of mental causation. I put this above by saying that it must
be possible to explain the causal powers of the mind with reference to the
physiological and, ultimately, the microphysical level. Mental causation
and macro causation generally must be micro-explainable. Another way of
saying this is that the causal powers of the mind cannot be free-floating
with regard to the levels below it. The most popular way of expressing this,
however, has been to say that the causal powers of the mind and the mind
generally must be reducible. The success of the physical sciences makes
it very likely, perhaps even virtually certain, that there are no irreduci-
ble mental causal powers. The concept of reduction is highly problematic,
though, because it is usually understood in such a way that two ideas are
rolled into one, namely that macro level entities are micro-explainable,
most likely by means of biconditional correlation laws, and that they can
be identified with micro level entities. But in this way the possibility of a
position like the MV, which is reductionist in the first sense, but not in
the second, is systematically concealed. So let me now set out the MV in
more detail.
4 For this diagnosis of a fallacy of equivocation I am indebted to Sturgeon (2000),
whose version of a composition account has been a major source of inspiration for
this paper.
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7 The Microstructure View
The MV thus accepts the empirical assumptions of the type identity theory,
but replaces its metaphysics through one based on the notion of microstruc-
ture (composition) and does so across the board, not only for conscious-
ness, but also for the manifest macrophysical world. The central empirical
assumption is that there are biconditional correlation laws linking macro
and micro level entities. Note that these laws may be quite specific. Such a
law might state, for example, that a certain kind of throbbing human ear
pain will occur if and only if a certain neuronal condition obtains. This sy-
stem of events at the neuronal level will be the microstructure of the pain,
what composes it at the neuronal level. The neuronal level in turn will be
composed of events at lower levels, down to the lowest microphysical level
if such there be. How far science will actually progress in discovering laws
of this kind is a question which cannot be answered from the armchair. It
seems likely though that some generalization will be so specific that unco-
vering them would neither be worth the trouble nor even possible, given
human epistemic limitations. The MV assumes that it is still reasonable to
maintain that each macro level type has its own characteristic type of mi-
crostructure, its micro level signature, as it were, even if we may be unable
to precisely delineate it in each case. This also means that supervenience
will hold: there will be no macro level differences without corresponding
micro level differences.5
The ontological difference between MV and type identity theories is re-
flected in the fact that the former, but not the latter, will think of the
correlation laws as genuine laws of nature—even though they are different
in kind from intra-level laws. The law statements will employ logically in-
dependent concepts with distinct cognitive significance, and the discussion
of the identity theory was designed to make plausible that if such concepts
refer, they must refer to different entities, on pain of avoiding the unpala-
table notion of merely subjectively different modes of access. It is worth
emphasizing that the MV does not only reject a posteriori identities of
this kind, but also priori identities (or eliminations) based on conceptual
analysis. The MV is thus also incompatible with any account trying to
analyze the notion of a given whole solely in terms of its parts, for exam-
ple through purely formal operations such as mereological operations. The
crucial point is that there are logically independent macro level concepts,
and that if these concepts succeed in referring to something, it must ac-
cordingly be to ontologically distinct entities. So if Martians came to earth
already possessing a more or less complete microphysical understanding of
5 I cannot here address issues related to externalism and the attendant question whe-
ther supervenience will be local or global.
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what is going on here, they would still need to acquire plenty of new, logi-
cally independent concepts of plants, of animals, people and their mental
states, of fashion trends and government institutions, and these concepts
would give them access to corresponding new entities so far unknown to
them.
It is a consequence of this account that macro and micro level entities
cannot be distinguished in terms of their size alone. Micro entities can get
as big as you like. The spacetime content of the entire universe described
solely at the level of quantum mechanics would still be a micro level entity.
An aggregate of neurons picked out only in neuronal level terms is just a
complex state of affairs at the neuronal level, certain neurons standing in
neuronal level relations to one another. What matters is the size of the en-
tities picked out by the primitive concepts of a given level such as “quark,”
“neuron,” or “skirt.”
The composition relation prototypically relates things. However, it is
also common to apply compositional concepts to events. We will then or-
dinarily say that one event consists in others. For example, the football
World Cup consists in various matches, which in turn consist of various
plays and actions. An election consists in a multitude of events involving
the voters and various officials. In essentially the same way I will also talk
about composition relations between levels, like the composition relation
between a conscious intention in consciousness and its neuronal level cor-
relate, which will likely be some system of neuronal events, like, just to
give a possible example, an assembly of neurons firing in synchrony at a
certain frequency.
8 The Microstructure View and Mental Causation
The topic of events naturally leads to the MV account of mental causation
and macro causation generally, which, following the dominant tradition of
thought, I will take to be a relation between events. I will not say more
about what I think causation is. In particular, I intend to be neutral with
regard to the issue of counterfactual vs. regularity vs. mechanism accounts
of causation. This appears appropriate, as the most important point to be
made in this paper is that macro and micro level causation do not com-
pete with one another. It seems to me this claim should come out as true
no matter what one’s account of causality is. It should be a condition of
adequacy on a satisfactory account of causality.
The key to the MV account of macro causation is to see that causal re-
lations are relations within a given level, that relations between levels are
compositional and lawlike rather than causal, and that the compositional
structure of higher level entities explains their causal interactions rather
than draining their causal powers away. Given this, we will be able to say,
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for example, that the intention causes the arm to go up without violating
a reasonable version of the principle of causal closure, because the macro
level cause will not cause anything on the micro level. Micro level causa-
tion at the neuronal and lower levels will go on, unperturbed as it were,
only connected to the macro level through compositional and lawlike rela-
tions, which, because they are different in kind from causal relations, do
not overdetermine their relata, while still explaining macro level causality.
The MV account is thus a version of what is often referred to as a dual
explananda account of mental causation: there is no conflict with micro-
physical causal explanations because these explain different phenomena. I
will now defend the principles behind this account.
Some authors have claimed that the microstructure causes the macro
entity (‘upward causation’), some that the macro entity acts causally on
its micro level correlate (‘downward causation’). Both these views sit un-
comfortably with the dominant conception of causality and for the same
reason. The macro entity and its microstructure are neither spatially nor
temporally distinct. The microstructure fills the same spacetime content
as the macro level entity. So it seems odd to say that the brain causes the
presence of its consciousness level correlate (Searle 1992) or that a wheel
rolling downhill causes the movements of the micro entities it is composed
of (Sperry 1969). Intuitively, no causal interaction is taking place here.
The wheel is not pushing its constituents along. We may still say that the
fact that the wheel rolls downhill explains the fact that its microconstitu-
ents move in a certain way. It explains this because the microconstituents
compose the wheel. That is why they have to go along for the ride. So this
is explanation through composition rather than causation. But this is of
course a rather trivial sort of explanation. The more interesting direction of
explanation is the opposite one, where we explain the motion of the wheel
in terms of the causal relations between the micro entities composing it,
and the causal interactions between the system of micro entities and its
environment. Likewise, it seems clear that the presence of a neuronal cor-
relate of consciousness does not cause the conscious state in any ordinary
sense of causation. It is not that the firing neurons trigger some process
which results in the relevant state of consciousness. And while there is a
law present here, this is generally not thought to be sufficient for the pre-
sence of causality. Moreover, a biconditional law like a correlation law is
particularly unsuited to underwrite the claim that the relation is causal,
as its existence gives us no reason to think that the brain state causes the
state of consciousness rather than conversely.
Now, of course Searle and Sperry are aware that their understanding of
causation is a non-standard one. Suffice it to note that for present purpo-
ses it does not really matter in the end whether the inter-level relations
should be called “causal” or not. We might of course decide to apply the
term “causality,” for example, to relations of mutual dependence between
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synchronous entities. (There is certainly an element of natural necessity
here, which provides at least some motivation for this extension of the
concept of causality.) The crucial point is that these relations are different
in kind from the prototypical instances of causality. This is true whether
we think of these relations in terms of different kinds of causal relations, or
of causal vs. non-causal relations. In accordance with the standard notion
of causality, I prefer to think of them as being non-causal though.
Because the micro-macro relations between minimal correlates and the
causal relations within levels are in any case different in kind, the fact that
one can explain some micro and macro effects both through their causes at
the same level and, by subsuming them under a correlation law, through
their micro or macro correlates, does not, I think, constitute overdetermi-
nation in any objectionable sense. Obviously, these cases are very different
from the putative examples of overdetermination discussed above, which
would involve spatiotemporally distinct, independent causes at the same
level. If somebody still insisted that there can only be one explanation for
a given phenomenon of whatever kind, I do not know what the justification
for such a principle would be. There seems to be no a priori justification
for it. Moreover, it would most likely make any satisfactory (dis)solution
of the problem of mental, or, more generally, macro causation, impossible.
But we are definitely much more certain of the fact of macro causation
than of the truth of any such principle.
Why do micro level causal interactions explain macro level ones? Intui-
tively, it seems obvious that they do. When we track the causal pathways
from the correlates of the intention to the physiological events in the arm
that cause the micro-correlate of the muscle contraction, we understand
much better how an intention can cause a bodily movement. Slightly more
technically, we can also say that the micro-macro relations are explanato-
ry because they integrate our knowledge at the mental and common sense
macrophysical level with our physiological theories. Furthermore, the dis-
covery of the microstructure of the mind also makes it possible to integrate
our physiological theories of mind and body. We will see in which respects
the physiology of the mind is continuous with that of the body and in
which ways it is special. The result of all this is a more unified and thus
more explanatory picture of the world. Finally, it seems to me there is
no clear sense to the idea that micro level entities take away causal po-
wers from their macro correlates. After all, that macro entities have the
microstructures that they do, is part of what they are, their empirically
discovered nature.
9 Diagonal Causation and Overdetermination
A critic who accepts the argument so far might now object as follows: “I
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will grant that the synchronous micro-macro relations are not causal. The
notion of causation requires a temporal difference between cause and ef-
fect. But what about the neuronal correlate of the intention to raise the
arm? That surely looks like a cause of the raising of the arm. In this case,
the relevant events are temporally and spatially distinct. So isn’t this an
instance of overdetermination after all? It seems that both the macro level
intention and its micro correlate cause the raising of the arm, which is thus
overdetermined.”
The critic appeals to “diagonal upward causation,” a causal relation bet-
ween a prior micro level and a posterior macro level event. Correspondin-
gly, “diagonal downward causation” would occur when a temporally prior
macro level event causes a micro level event, as when the intention causes
the physiological correlate of the arm going up. Now, should we recognize
diagonal causation, and does it lead to overdetermination?
To deny that diagonal relations are causal would needlessly put us at
odds with common sense. We would be forced to deny, for example, that
a virus—or, more strictly, the entry of a virus into a human body—could
cause the outbreak of a disease. But we do not need to deny this, becau-
se diagonal causation does not lead to overdetermination. I have already
argued that the fact that an entity can be explained both through its
intra-level causal and its inter-level compositional relations does not lead
to overdetermination. I now want to extend that argument by showing
that, when all facts about intra-level and inter-level relations are fixed,
there is no further causal work to do. Diagonal relations are an automatic
fallout from these relations, and talk about “diagonal causation” thus does
not introduce any additional, independent causal factors and does not lead
to overdetermination.
To see this, let us take a closer look at the virus example. The example
is an instance of diagonal causation because the virus belongs to a micro
level relative to the disease, which is a macro level condition affecting va-
rious organs and the well-being of the whole person. The microstructures
of the affected parts of the body (or mind) will change in ways charac-
teristic of the disease. These changed structures are its microstructure.
The evidence for the diagonal causal claim consists in a strong correlation
between the presence of the virus and the outbreak of the disease. But
now suppose it turns out that the virus is not actually responsible for the
microstructural changes characteristic of the disease. These are, we may
assume, rather caused by prions thriving in the same environment as the
virus. The point now is that under these circumstances the virus also has
no claim to be the diagonal cause of the disease. It would not make sense
to accept the facts as described in this scenario and yet to insist that the
virus causes the disease. The virus cannot cause the disease except by, or
independently of, causing its microstructure. Analogous remarks apply to
diagonal downward causation. The intention to raise the arm has no claim
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to be the cause of the physiological happenings which compose the raising
of the arm if it does not actually cause that raising. If some other macro
level phenomenon caused the raising, that phenomenon will also be the
diagonal cause of the raising’s microstructure.
Consideration of these examples shows that there are no further, additio-
nal facts about whether diagonal causal relations obtain, facts independent
of facts about prototypically causal relations within levels and facts about
relations between levels like compositional facts. For if there were such
facts, it would have to be possible, for example, for the virus to diagonally
cause the disease without causing its microstructure. Since that does not
appear to be possible, I am drawn to the conclusion that talk about diago-
nal causation is a sort of abbreviation for talk about certain constellations
of causal intra-level and compositional inter-level facts. Diagonal causal
explanation is a thus a kind of hybrid explanation tracking both micro-
macro and the prototypically causal intra-level relations. That is, to say
that the correlate of the intention diagonally causes the arm to be raised is
just a way of saying that it causes a micro level entity which composes this
macro event. To say that the intention causes this micro level entity is just
a way of saying that it causes some macro level entity which is composed
by the micro entity. This is all there is to diagonal causation. There are
no independent causal forces operating diagonally, and therefore there is
also no overdetermination through diagonal causation.
10 Conclusion
To wrap things up, let me explain how the proposed account of mental
causation depends on the abandonment of the received metaphysical
picture with its elimination of the manifest macrophysical world. I
have argued that we can make sense of mental causation if we clearly
distinguish compositional inter-level and causal intra-level relations. We
can see then that mental causation does not violate the causal closure
of the microphysical level, but is rather explained by causal relations at
lower levels. But suppose now we would accept the MV for consciousness
only, while still trying to eliminate the manifest macrophysical world in
favor of its microconstituents and their effects on the mind, that is, the
mere appearance of this world. The simple reason why this cannot work is
that there would be nothing left for the mind to cause—at least nothing
physical. We still could not make sense of our natural conviction that the
mind can also bring about changes in the physical world, because, since
this world will be an exclusively microphysical world, the mind would
either have to violate causal closure by perturbing the microphysical
entities, overdetermine them, or be identical with some of them. So
we would be back to our original predicament. The MV account thus
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essentially depends on the rejection of the traditional metaphysics, and
to the extent that it does, it dissolves rather than solves the problem,
because one of the key assumptions defining the problem in its traditional
form is simply abandoned. Given this initial dissolution, the problem can
then, if the argument of this paper is correct, be solved in a fairly simple
way. But the fact that the dissolution makes the solution available is also
a powerful argument in favor of it, especially in view of the fact that all
other options appear to be extremely implausible.
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